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discredit the regulatory policies of the Administration and made efforts
at constructive reform suspect as well. "Regulatory reform" was taken
by critics to be a codeword for selling out to business. 14
The polarization between Reagan loyalists seeking to dismantle the
regulatory state and critics wishing to discredit the Administration is
unfortunate. Given the deep flaws in most regulatory statutes, even
those which seek to correct obvious and important market failures,
informed debate is required, not name-calling. It is no answer to the
imperfections of the Clean Air Act15 simply to repeal the act. Instead,
amendment of existing statutes and changes in the practices of regula-
tory agencies can, in principle, bring regulatory policy closer to the
ideal of an economically efficient program. 16 Some of the policies of
1988, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1926 (1988), but only one other rule regulating a single toxic
substance, ethylene dibromide, was in the pipelin~ at the end of the Reagan
administration. In 1988, OSHA announced that it would seek to regulate a large
number of substances in a single generic rule making, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,960 (1988), and
on the last day of Reagan'~ tenure a rule was issued. 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (1989). The
impact of this rule is likely to be modest, however, since generally it merely codifies
standards recommended by private advisory groups.
EPA did successfully issue final rules in the water pollution area. Crandall & Portney,
supra note 12, at 72. However, it has made less progress in the air quality program.
While State Implementation Plans have been quickly approved, only one revision to the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) had been proposed or made final by
1989. See 49 Fed. Reg. 10,408 (1984) (notice of proposed revision to the primary and
secondary NAAQS for particulate matter); 52 Fed. Reg. 24,634 (1987) (final rule for
primary NAAQS promulgated); 52 Fed. Reg. 24,670 (1987) (secondary NAAQS revision
continued). EPA did solicit comments from the public on adding another primary
standard for sulfur oxides in 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988). During these years,
EPA proposed not to revise the primary and secondary NAAQS for nitrogen dioxide, 50
Fed. Reg. 25,532 (1985), and the primary NAAQS for carbon monoxide, 50 Fed. Reg.
37,484 (1985), even though the Carter EPA had proposed certain changes to the latter
NAAQS. See 45 Fed. Reg. 55,066 (1980). Reagan's EPA also revoked the secondary
NAAQS for carbon monoxide. 50 Fed. Reg. at 37,484. The administration was also
slow in issuing New Source Performance Standards and little progress was made under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Crandall & Portney, supra note 12, at 72-
73.
14 Weidenbaum argues that as "long as regulatory changes are seen as primarily a
problem for business, there will be limited public support for reform." Weidenbaum,
supra note 5, at 40. Vogel notes that the "relative strength of proregulation forces in
Congress throughout the 1980s reflected in part a continued backlash against the
administration's earlier deregulatory initiatives." D. Vogel, supra note 8, at 278.
15 For a discussion of these imperfections, see B. Ackerman & W. Hassler, Clean
Coal/Dirty Air (1981). For a critique ofthe Clean Water Act, see B. Ackerman, S. Rose-
Ackerman,]. Sawyer & D. Henderson, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality
(1974) [hereinafter Search for Environmental Quality]. On the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 354-67 and sources cited therein.
16 The economics and policy analysis literature is full of such proposals. For
accessible discussions see]. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation
(1988); Search for Environmental Quality, supra note 15; Ackerman & Stewart,
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the Reagan administration could, in fact, be part of such a progressive
reform of administrative law. Regrettably, critics have lumped them in
with other initiatives directed in a simplistic way toward reducing the
influence of government on the economy.17 In some ways the Reagan
administration invited such criticism by administering their purported
regulatory reforms in a way that left the White House open to the
charge of selling out to special interests. 18
Section I outlines the ways in which regulatory policy during the Rea-
gan administration has failed to fulfill the promise of genuine reform.
Section II follows up this critique with some suggestions for the Bush
administration if it wishes to make genuine reform a priority.
I. REFORM OR SELLOUT
Four different types of action and inaction pushed regulatory policy
in a retrograde direction in the last decade. First, the White House
attempted to impose rationality and coordination on executive branch
regulatory agencies in a way which invited criticisms of undue political
influence. Second, by assuming that deregulation was per se desirable,
policy makers neglected to observe that deregulation of one set of
industry practices might increase the need to regulate other aspects of.
behavior. Third, in areas of social regulation, such as environmental
policy and occupational health and safety, where the underlying statu-
tory purposes are popular, the administration shied away from genuine
incentive-based reforms. Finally, even in its own terms of reducing reg-
ulatory burdens, the administration failed to the extent that agencies
were poorly run with unqualified appointees, vacant posts, and key
decisions not made.
Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum.
J. Envtl. L. 171 (1988).
17 See Weidenbaum, supra note 5, at 36-37 (quoting Pertschuk, The Case for
Consumerism, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 26). See also M. ToJchin &
S. ToJchin, Buying into America (1988).
18 Weidenbaum believes that the Reagan administration may have reduced the
chances for genuine reform. He writes:
[T]he public and, especially, the organized environmental groups, were aroused
by the strong language and public stands of Secretary of Interior James Watt.
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch evoked a similar public response .
As a result, the entire spectrum of environmental organizations became a
solid phalanx of opposition to virtually every regulatory change proposed by the
Reagan administration.
Weidenbaum, supra note 5, at 18-19. This had, by the middle of Reagan's term in office,
created a climate in which Congress did not trust agencies to carry out their statutory man-
dates. Id. at 38. Weidenbaum worried in 1983 that the Administration's actions could "be
leading inadvertently to a round of expanding governmental intervention." Id. at 39.
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